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This paper investigates the existence of markups and their cyclical behaviour at industry 
sector level. Markups are given as a price-cost relation that is estimated from a dynamic, 
structural model of the firm. The firms face costly adjustment of labour and potential financial 
constraints. The model is tested on a panel of firm- and plant-level data from Norwegian 
manufacturing industries. The results indicate a frequent presence of pro-cyclical markups. 
Labour adjustment costs are small and negligible. The results are related to the role played by 
unions in a setting with high union density. 
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1. Introduction 
Microeconomic foundations of modern macroeconomics imply that the price-cost margins of 
firms vary over the business cycle. Empirical evidence, available largely from US industry 
sector studies but increasingly from other countries, supports this. The variation in price-cost 
margins depends on the ability to adjust prices in relation to the development of marginal 
costs. Strategic price setting behaviour is one source of markup fluctuations. In imperfectly 
competitive markets this variation may go either way, pro-cyclical as shown by Green and 
Porter (1984), Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986, 1987) and Chirinko and Fazzari 
(1994), or counter-cyclical as indicated by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Borenstein and 
Shepard (1996) and summarised in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). On the cost side, it may 
be reasonable to assume that marginal costs will increase in booms due to increased capacity 
utilization (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). Bils (1987), in his seminal paper based on US 
industry sector data, finds that prices tend to adjust more slowly than costs, and that markups 
are correspondingly counter-cyclical, in particular due to firms not lowering prices 
sufficiently during recessions. However, as indicated by the vast literature within the field, 
theoretical predictions as well as empirical evidence are inconclusive as to the directions of 
these markup fluctuations over the business cycle. Importantly, markup fluctuations may 
contribute to reinforcing or weakening the general business cycle fluctuation. In small, open 
economies, where booms and recessions often originate from external shocks, this feature of 
price-cost margins may be of particular importance for stabilisation policy. 
The contribution of this paper is to analyse whether markup fluctuations are associated 
with costly adjustments of input factors. Slow adjustment of production factors may affect 
markups through firms’ marginal costs. Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1998) use 2-digit industry-
level data for USA and find evidence of capital adjustment costs together with counter-
cyclical markups. Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986), using US data, analyse to what 
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degree firms are hampered in adjusting labour and employment levels, thus affecting 
cyclicality of marginal costs. If the labour stock is costly to adjust, firms will at any point in 
time have to consider the size of current as well as future labour stocks. Fariñas and Huergo 
(2003) use Spanish data and estimate markups and labour adjustment costs, detecting positive 
and asymmetric adjustment costs, and pro-cyclical markup. Nationwide unions that are 
concerned with wages and employment levels, as in the Scandinavian countries (see 
Wallerstein et al., 1997), may contribute to dampening wage fluctuations through wages not 
being lowered in recessions while being moderated in booms. Of further relevance for 
Norway, Kahn (1998) shows that during recent years a recentralisation has taken place in 
wage determination. On the other hand, demand for employment stability may indicate high 
adjustment costs, potentially counteracting a wage-smoothing effect on markups.  
In this paper we use micro data from Norwegian manufacturing industry sectors to 
investigate whether markup fluctuations and labour adjustment costs coexist. The period 
1978–1991 is covered. The Norwegian economy is characterised as small and open, and with 
a high union density and coverage. An advantage of these data is that they also exist for 
relatively small firms and plants. Utilising micro-data for plants and firms means that we are 
using data at the level where decisions about production are taken. We believe that firm- and 
plant-level data give more reliable markup estimates.1 Firstly, they allow us to correct for 
firm-specific non-observabilities, such as productivity differences between firms and effects 
of local wage bargaining. This is of importance, since production technology and scale 
economies are relevant for the price setting behaviour of firms. Aggregating up to industry 
level ignores these differences, and may thereby introduce biases into the estimation of the 
marginal costs and markups. Secondly, using plant- and firm-level data has the added 
advantage that the model is implemented at the level for which it is constructed and thereby 
                                                 
1 Most of the papers investigating markup fluctuations use sector-level data, notable exceptions including 
Chirinko and Fazzari (1994, 2000), and Fariñas and Huergo (2003). 
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eliminates the notion of a representative firm. This is of significance if the cost elements of 
importance for markup cyclicality are firm specific and not industry sector specific. Such 
heterogeneity is captured using firm- or plant-level data. The markups are measured for 
different manufacturing industry sectors separately, which enables us to detect possible 
sectoral differences. The sector-wise markups are allowed to vary over the business cycle. 
There are several advantages from using an approach where markups are estimated 
instead of taken as observable. First, it is not necessary to make assumptions concerning 
specific relationships between average and marginal costs, nor to proxy for marginal costs. 
Furthermore, the econometric model is based on an Euler equation for labour, making it 
unnecessary to parameterise the gross production function or the cost function of the firm. 
Another advantage of our study is that the economic model is based on the optimisation 
problem of the firm, and not a reduced form as in many studies. The dynamic modelling 
framework takes current as well as future production and labour demand into account. This 
way, we determine within the model whether or not adjustment costs are present when 
estimating the cyclicality of markups. 
The next section describes the model. The empirical specification is derived in Section 
3, and data are presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we report the results, while Section 6 
includes some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Dynamic Optimisation Problem 
Our approach is rather general, and we avoid using rather restrictive functional forms of the 
production function. Marginal costs cannot be directly observed. Instead, they are parameters 
estimated in an econometric model. The model includes fully flexible and quasi-fixed input 
factors. The objective of a firm indexed with subscript i is to maximise the present value Vi,t-1 
of profits at the end of period t-1. The firm operates in an imperfectly competitive market. 
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However, no assumptions are made concerning specific kinds of output market imperfections. 
The reason is that several industries are considered, where the firms may operate in 
competitive or monopolistically competitive markets, or within oligopolistic market 
structures. Net output, employment, capital, investment and variable factors (and the 
corresponding prices) are denoted respectively as Y (p), L (w), K (pI), I (pI), Z (c). Then a 
firm’s objective can be formally expressed as 
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Contemporary variables are known to the firm with certainty, whereas future variables are 
stochastic. Net output of firm i is assumed to be given by 
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.2 This means both labour, L, and capital, K, are 
quasi-fixed, and therefore costly to adjust. For ease of exposition, we disregard potential 
cross-adjustment costs.3 The dynamics of labour and capital adjustments are respectively 
 and −−= tititi KKI δ , where δ is the capital depreciation rate. 
The first order condition for fully flexible input factors, Zi,t , is given by 
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2 This formulation recognizes that we do not observe gross output, only output net of adjustment costs. 
3 This is a simplification in line with most of the empirical literature analysing the adjustment of capital and 
labour separately. Evidently, labour adjustment may affect capital adjustment and vice versa. However, in this 
dynamical setting, more will be lost in terms of clarity than gained in interpretation of firm behaviour by 
including interelatedness of adjustment costs in our model. 
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facing firm i in period t. Note that our measure of markup is related to the demand elasticity. 
In equilibrium, the markup level and its fluctuations can be explained by cost changes as well 
as the product market behaviour of the firm. The estimated markup will indicate whether an 
imperfectly competitive market is present.4 
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According to equation (3), the present value of a marginal unit of labour should equal the 
wage wit. The first term at the left hand side, which equals 
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The first order condition for capital is5 
 
                                                 
4 Our general formulation encompasses several different market settings and price games by a including number 
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The equation states that along the optimal investment path, in any period t, the increase in the 
value of the firm resulting from one additional unit of capital equates benefits and costs over 
time: investment in one period affects the value of the firm this period and subsequent 
periods, and adjustment costs will affect the dynamic path of investments. 
To arrive at an estimable expression that summarises the optimising behaviour of the 
firm, we need to specify the adjustment cost functions. The gross production function, F(.), 
can be maintained at a general level provided we make assumptions on the returns to scale 
elasticity of the net production function. The net production function is assumed to be 
homogeneous. At the outset, we use symmetric specifications of adjustment costs for labour 
and capital. A standard convex adjustment cost function for labour, GL(.), is written as 
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theorem the scale elasticity of the net product function, , is given by tiY ,
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Rearranging (5) and solving for marginal product of labour results in 
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included in the first order condition for labour through 
consists of only observables. Capital adjustm
L
F
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∂  and the definition of ti,~ν . Reliable 
data on capital are hard to acquire, and empirically the functional form and magnitude of 
capital adjustment costs are unsettled.6 It is therefore convenient to use this form, where 
different capital adjustment cost levels can be taken care of by changes of variables included 
in the square bracket in the expression for ti,~ν . A value ti,~ν  = 1 corresponds to a given 
magnitude of capital adjustment costs. If, for example sK increases, this will affect ti,~ν . 
Similarly, a different functional form of adjustment costs might also change t,i~ν . Thus, 
changes in ti,~ν  away from its baseline value of 1 may be interpreted as sensitivity in the 
estimates to different levels of capital adjustment costs. 
We may interpret ti,
~ν  as short-term returns to scale, while ti,ν  may be interpreted as 
long-term returns. In the model here, this interpretation is consistent with the common 
assumption that capital is less flexible than labour, and in general predetermined through sunk 
investments before prices are set. This, however, does not imply that labour adjustments are 
unaffected by capital adjustments. Instead, capital adjustment costs affect adjustment of 
                                                 
6 Note that, as long as labour and capital adjustment costs are separable, we could have used a more general form 
of capital adjustment costs without altering (6). Empirical evidence indicates that adjustment costs of capital are 
non-convex and irreversible. See for instance Doms and Dunne (1998), Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999), 
Abel and Eberly (2002), and Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003). 
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labour and other factors through assumptions on returns to scale. This implies that for a given 
ti,
~ν , demand shocks are reflected in prices and in the use of flexible factors Zi,t, rather than in 
immediate adjustment of capital.7 Finally, note also that as long as capital adjustment costs 
are additively separable from labour, as in the chosen model formulation, first-order 
conditions for labour are unaffected. 
Now, assume that the decision-makers have rational expectations. We then replace the 
expectation operator with white noise expectation errors, which are uncorrelated with any 
information at time t. Using equations (3) and (6), normalising with the value of capital, 
, after rearranging we obtain the following equation which serves as the basis for our 
empirical specification 
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A final remark about the prices should be made. Firm-specific prices cannot be directly 
observed, which is a reason for not modelling price games. As already mentioned, the 
underlying assumption is that competition may vary over the business cycle and among 
sectors. The parameterisation of the markup will give room for these types of variation. 
 
                                                 
7 We abstract from the choice of hours worked, indicating that such adjustment costs are of less magnitude. In 
the manufacturing sectors to be investigated, most workers are full-time workers and hours worked mostly 
follow contractual hours contained in the agreements between firms and unions. As a result, employment 
changes capture well the fluctuations of the labour input. 
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3. Empirical Specification 
The cyclical fluctuations in markups due to cyclical variations in demand and marginal costs, 
are represented by parameterising ti,μ  as 
 
tjjjtjti ,
10
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where subscript j denotes industry. Thus, we assume that all firms within a sector have the 
same markup. According to (8), the markup term consists of a constant term, , which is 
insensitive to demand fluctuations,
0
jμ
8 and a variable term, . The variation is related to 
changes in sectoral gross domestic products, 
1
jμ
tj,Ψ , as measured relative to the four 
surrounding years. The variable is expressed astj ,Ψ 9 
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The variable  picks up the degree to which demand each year in the sector j to which a 
plant i belongs is higher or lower than the general trend. We will use a Taylor approximation 
of first order for the term 
tj ,Ψ
1,
,
+ti
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μ
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The final model to be estimated is derived by substituting in (7) the expressions (8)–
(9) for μi,t, and is presented with unrestricted parameters πk, k = 1–4, which are based on the 
                                                 
8 A constant term equal to unity does not necessarily indicate perfect competition, due to lack of normalization 
over the industry sectors. However, variations indicate differences in degree of competition. 
9 The five-year centered moving average is also used in other related studies. See Bils (1987) and Galeotti and 
Schiantarelli (1998). 
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When estimating (10) we have included a firm-specific fixed effect, fi. The fixed firm effect 
can be interpreted as accounting for firm-specific characteristics that are constant over the 
sample period. We have also included time dummies, γt, to represent the effect of macro 
shocks. The estimation is carried through separately for each sector, since we want to allow 
for sectoral differences in the parameters. 
We assume that the decision-makers have rational expectations, i.e., the errors they 
make in forecasting are uncorrelated with the information available when the forecasts are 
made. This rational expectations hypothesis suggests orthogonality conditions that can be 
used in a generalised method of moments (GMM) as outlined in Hansen (1982).10 Variables 
dated t and earlier which are correlated with the variables in the regression, are valid 
instruments given that the error term, ei,t+1, is serially uncorrelated. The firm-fixed effects are 
removed by estimating the model in first-differences and consequently, a first-order serial 
correlation is introduced. To test for the serial correlation, we apply the first-order and 
                                                 
10 The unconstrained GMM coefficients are estimated using the GMM procedure written in STATA by 
Roodman (2005). This procedure has finite-sample corrections for the two-step covariance matrix developed by 
Windmeijer (2005). 
 10
second-order autocorrelation tests, denoted in the tables as AR(1) and AR(2) tests. Further 
testing for the validity of the instruments is done by the Sargan/Hansen test.11 In our 
estimation, we have used the following variables in levels as instruments, 
ττ
ττ
ττττ
ττ
ττττ ψ i
i
I
iiii
i
I
iiii L
KP
ZcLw
Kp
ZcLw
 , , j,⋅++ , all at dates 2−= tτ  and earlier, since 1−= tτ  is 
valid only when there is no serial correlation in the error terms. 
The GMM estimates of the model give unrestricted estimates of the unrestricted 
parameters, πk, k = 1–4, while we are interested in the deep parameters, , , 0μ 1μ ν~ , and s. To 
find these latter parameters from the GMM estimates, we use a minimum distance estimation 
method.12 Since a negative s parameter in the adjustment function is hard to interpret and 
inconsistent with the model, we restrict it to be non-negative by assuming )exp(η=s  and 
allowing η to be computed without restrictions when doing the minimum distance estimation. 
 
4. Data 
The empirical work is based on a large set of unbalanced annual data of Norwegian plants and 
firms within manufacturing industries for the period 1978–1991, collected by Statistics 
Norway. Income statement and balance sheet information are provided from Statistics of 
Accounts for all firms with more than 50 employees during the period 1978–1990. For all 
firms included in Statistics Norway’s Statistics of Accounts, plant-level information about 
production, production costs, investment and capital stock is available from the 
Manufacturing Statistics. The micro-level data are matched with information about the 
                                                 
11 See Arellano and Bond (1991) for a complete discussion of both the auto-correlation tests and the 
overidentification test. 
12 The proof of the consistency and asymptotic normality of the minimum distance estimator can be found in 
Appendix 3A, Hsiao (1986). 
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sectoral gross domestic product at sector level. The industry sector values are collected from 
National Accounts. The empirical analysis is carried out at the plant level.13 
We investigate plants where the changes in the number of employees are of reasonable 
magnitude. Observations with employment levels 3 times larger than or 1/3 less than that of 
the previous year are excluded. Furthermore, to make the sample as homogeneous as possible, 
we include only plants with more than 5 and fewer than 500 employees, whereas firm size is 
limited to 1500 employees. Lastly, we exclude observations where the calculated annual man-
hours worked per employee are outside the interval [400, 2500].14 
[Table 1 about here] 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Means are calculated over all observations 
and for 1985. We see that the sales/capital ratio, pY/pIK, as well as the costs/capital ratio, 
(wL+cZ)/pIK, vary among the industries. Comparing the differences between the sales/capital 
ratio and the costs/capital ratio, we find that these differences are approximately 0.1, which 
indicates the presence of a markup and possibly some degree of market power. The average 
plant size in the sample is over 100 employees in most industries which, in a Norwegian 
context, implies that we are dealing with relatively large plants. We note from Table 1 that 
there are several observations with zero adjustments, which might indicate non-convex 
adjustments costs. On the other hand, frequent adjustments around zero are consistent with 
convex adjustments costs. This leaves a rather mixed picture of the exact form of adjustment 
costs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See Appendix B for details on variable definitions and construction. 
14 The upper bound of 2500 amounts to 1.5 times standard working hours per year. We assume that average 
working hours greater than 2500 are due to reporting or measurement errors. 
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5. Results 
Estimation results are reported in Table 2. The unrestricted parameter estimates of the Euler 
equation used for calculating the deep parameters are presented in the upper panel. They are 
based on one-step first-differenced estimates of GMM.15 In the lower panel of Table 2, we 
report restricted estimates revealed by the minimum distance procedure. The test statistic is 
the value function of the minimum distance procedure, asymptotically distributed as χ2 with 
one degree of freedom (equal to the number of restrictions). The non-linear common factor 
restriction 
1
32
4 π
πππ ⋅=  is imposed on the unrestricted parameter estimates reported in the 
upper panel ( 4321  and ,,, ππππ ), to get the restricted estimates reported in the lower panel. 
Thus the test statistic is a test of the validity of the common factor (ComFac) restriction. It is 
immediately observed that the ComFac test indicates that the restriction is rejected in several 
sectors. Therefore, we have also tested a model where adjustment costs are excluded. Main 
conclusions about base markup and cyclical variation remain. We return to this issue below 
when discussing the sign and economical significance of the restricted results. 
We interpret the base markup, the non-variable term μ0, as the proportion of the 
markup which is insensitive to demand fluctuations, where at the outset we expect . 
The cyclical part of the markup, , may be positive or negative, indicating pro- and counter-
cyclical markup fluctuations respectively. To interpret its size and magnitude, we assume that 
we find . This implies that a relative change in the (detrended) GDP of 6 per cent 
increases the markup by 0.03, for instance from 1.00 to 1.03. With the non-negativity 
restriction on labour adjustment costs, there is an adjustment cost parameter s ≥ 0. Initially, 
we assume constant unit elasticity of scale. This assumption is supported by the findings in 
10 ≈μ
1μ
5.01 =μ
                                                 
15 We return later to extensions with the two-step first-differenced GMM estimator, including a system estimator. 
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Klette (1999) that increasing returns to scale are not a widespread phenomenon in Norwegian 
manufacturing industries. 
[Table 2 about here] 
In four industry sectors we find the invariant markup term, , to be significantly 
above unity. In the remaining three sectors (Food, Chemicals, Metal products) it is not 
significantly different from unity. An estimate of μ0 ≥ 1 is consistent with the descriptive 
statistics in Table 1, and also with other international studies using an Euler equation 
approach on panel data (see for instance Whited, 1992 and Hubbard et al., 1995). It is, 
however, not trivial to draw inferences from these observations to the existence of market 
power. Even for industries with a fixed markup term not significantly different from unity, we 
cannot rule out that market power prevails. The main reason is that we have not normalised 
the markups over industry sectors with a base value corresponding to perfect competition. 
Then, fluctuations in the markup may indicate periods where market power is effective, while 
potential for reaping these benefits is not continuously present. In another study, using larger 
panel data sets from Norwegian manufacturing industries, Klette (1999) finds μ0 greater than 
unity, indicating moderate but statistically significant market power. 
0μ
Our estimates of the cyclical markup term, , indicate a statistically significant pro-
cyclical markup in six of the industries, while there is a statistically significant counter-
cyclical markup in one industry sector (Textiles and clothing). However, coefficient estimates 
indicate a relatively moderate variation around the invariant markup term. The general 
tendency of pro-cyclical markups corresponds to the findings of Domowitz, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1986, 1987), Chirinko and Fazzari (1994) and Bottasso, Galeotti and Sembenelli 
(1999). It is hard to relate the estimated cyclicities to industry specific factors. Generally one 
would try to explain differences among sectors by degree of competition (e.g., as measured by 
a Herfindahl index), by degree of sheltering from foreign competition, whether firms in the 
1μ
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sector are basically import or export competing, or according to type of production 
(consumption goods, durables etc.). The model here does not incorporate proxies for industry 
sector competitiveness, and thereby we are unable to conclude further on firms’ potential for 
strategic price-setting behaviour. The problem is, as has been pointed out by others (see for 
example Klette, 1999), that even at sector levels as used here, there will be too much 
heterogeneity to perform adequate analyses of these phenomena and underlying explanations. 
Market power, for example, may differ more within a sector than across average firms in 
different industries.16 Our estimates are based on the assumption that the behaviour of all 
firms within a sector is identical, which is a limiting assumption due to data availability. This 
might introduce a measurement error bias, which is in general a problem with sector-level 
data representing firms competing in imperfectly competitive markets. See Klette and 
Griliches (1996) for a more detailed analysis. Time-invariant variations will be picked up by 
the fixed effect factor. Thus, we refrain from relating the observed variations to industry 
specific factors, other than adjustment of labour. When it comes to cost variations and 
potential union power, we note that the relevant union branches are industry sector specific, 
covering to a large degree the sectors analysed here.17 
The employment adjustment costs parameter, s, is statistically different from zero in 
two sectors, ‘Textiles and clothing’ and ‘Chemicals’. However, the ComFac test is rejected in 
all sectors but ‘Food’, ‘Chemicals’ and (borderline) ‘Metal products’. Thus, only one sector, 
‘Chemicals’, seem to have significant pro-cyclical variation in markup and presence of 
adjustment costs. In this sector, the cost factor is also of some magnitude. Using the estimate 
of s = 40 in the formula for adjustment costs of labour, GL, and assuming a labour cost 
adjustment of 5% of the work force, this will correspond to a production loss of 5%. In 
                                                 
16 See Klette (1999), p. 470, for a more thorough discussion of this in industry sector studies. 
17 The main unions were part of the central union, LO. Much of wage negotiation takes place at industry sector 
level, though with a tendency for recentralisation during the relevant period (Kahn, 1998). Later, after the period 
covered by data here, several of the industry union branches have merged. 
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‘Chemicals’, rather specialised labour is demanded, and firms are often located in areas with 
limited industry sector diversity. Union density is relatively high, and the resulting union 
strength may contribute to smoothening wage adjustments over the business cycle, in 
particular by fighting wage reductions in downturns. Resistance to employment adjustments, 
to be paid for by some wage rigidity over the business cycle, may be commensurable with 
union objectives, and expectedly observed where union density and tariff coverage is high. 
Finding that labour is costly to acquire is therefore not unreasonable. 
The ComFac test indicates acceptance of the model also in ‘Food’ and, at 10% level of 
significance, in ‘Metal products’. In these sectors, which both have pro-cyclical markup, 
adjustment costs are not significantly different from zero. In these two sectors, labour 
adjustments run smoothly, and wages seem to be moderated over the business cycle as 
compared with prices. This may be due to union policy of preferring small variations in 
wages, combined with a labour market policy where firms may lay off workers during 
downturns on a temporary basis, thus having reserve labour at hand. For the remaining sectors 
with pro-cyclical markup, ‘Wood products’, ‘Paper’, and ‘Mineral and Metals’, the ComFac 
test rejects the restriction, and similarly in ‘Textiles and clothing’, which is the only sector 
where markup is counter-cyclical. Using a more extensive set of instruments where we also 
include 
2,2
2,2,
−−
−−
ti
I
t
titi
Kp
Yp
, the ComFac test still rejects the null hypothesis of a common factor for 
this sector.18 Thus, we cannot conclude clearly on the coexistence of counter-cyclical 
markups and adjustments costs. On the other hand, when testing the model without labour 
adjustment costs, i.e., setting sL = 0, for this sector the significant counter-cyclical markup 
remains. A possible explanation of the latter then is that additional labour is available at high 
wage costs in upturns, whereas wages are reduced relatively more than prices in downturns. 
                                                 
s and ,, 00 μμ18 The results (coefficients and st. errors) are 1.042 (0.010), –0.209 (0.018), and 5.902 (1.071) (  
respectively). 
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The relatively low union density in this sector, see Table 3, may account for a limited role of 
wage smoothening over the business cycle. 
                                                
[Table 3 about here] 
We have investigated how sensitive the markup fluctuations may be to the inclusion of 
adjustment costs. By disregarding adjustment costs, the coefficients may be interpreted 
directly from the unrestricted estimates. Testing the model with sL = 0, and comparing to the 
unrestricted estimates in Table 2 (upper panel) the invariant markup terms, , remain almost 
unaltered. For the cyclical markup term, , all signs are unaltered, and apart from one sector 
(‘Paper’), the magnitude of coefficients and their level of significance change only 
marginally. Thus, differences between a restricted and unrestricted model seem not to be 
economically significant when it comes to the interpretation of markup behaviour. 
0μ
1μ
The pro-cyclical markup is consistent with wage smoothening over the business cycle. 
We have furthermore found little indication of significant labour adjustment costs. It should 
be noted, however, that an insignificant adjustment costs parameter may only be used to reject 
the symmetric and convex adjustment costs structure, not to exclude the existence of labour 
adjustment costs in general. We have experimented with different formulations, including 
asymmetric adjustment costs, without obtaining sharper results, nor does the introduction of a 
zero cost interval dramatically change the result that labour adjustment costs play a negligible 
role. Although somewhat surprising, the results are not unreasonable. We note that other 
studies also tend to find relatively small adjustment costs for labour (see for instance the 
discussion by Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996).19 With the weak tendency for pro-cyclical 
markup fluctuations we have found here, according to our model, small and insignificant 
labour adjustment costs, as found, are not unexpected. The results indicate some market 
 
19 Fariñas and Huergo (2003) find significant labour adjustment costs for Spain. Note, however, that the Spanish 
labour market is characterised by strong employment protection (OECD 1999), expectedly giving rise to higher 
adjustment costs. 
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power on the output side. On the other side, relatively strong unions, with densities above 
50%, contribute potentially to flexibility in adjusting input factors (see Salvanes (1997) for a 
discussion of flexibility of the Norwegian labour market). 
We have, without reporting the results, also estimated the two-step first-differenced 
estimates of GMM using the same set of instruments as the ones reported in Table 2. The 
results are of the same magnitude. The labour adjustment cost parameter s is significant only 
in ‘Chemicals’, which is the only sector where the ComFac test is still not rejected. We have 
also experimented with the one-step Arellano–Bover system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 
1995). Given the limited number of firms in some of the sectors, the number of instruments 
gets too large relative to the number of observations, and we have therefore not reported 
results from there either.20 
As another test of robustness, we relax the assumption of constant returns to scale 
when estimating the deep parameters by the minimum distance method. However, since the 
returns to scale parameter ν~  is interacted with the other parameters, computational 
difficulties arise.21 Therefore, instead we impose a value of ν~  = 0.90.22 As expected, we find 
that the estimated deep parameters are getting proportionally smaller compared with the 
results presented in Table 2. Levels of significance remain the same. Relaxing the assumption 
of constant returns to scale does not affect the revealed cyclical behaviour of markup. 
A further extension of the model might be to consider financial constraints, either as 
dividend constraints or as debt constraints. A dividend restriction prevents the firm from 
raising external funds by issuing shares to meet the owners' return claims. The non-negative 
                                                 
21  and 
20 Still, we find it somewhat comforting that the magnitude of the unrestricted coefficients, especially 
ππ , are of the same order as those reported in Table 2. 
21 From equation (7), we see that the scale elasticity ν~ occurs in the denominator in all terms on the right hand 
side. We are therefore unable to identify it. It can be considered a scaling parameter. 
22 Klette (1999) finds that in four out of fourteen Norwegian manufacturing sectors, constant returns to scale do 
not prevail. Here, returns to scale are in the range 0.89–0.96. 
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dividend restriction can loosely be interpreted as a premium on external funding. Borrowing 
restrictions may be formulated either as an absolute debt limit or, with interest payments 
increasing, in a variable which is correlated with the likelihood of facing borrowing 
constraints (see for instance Bond and Meghir, 1994, Chirinko and Schaller, 1995, and for a 
recent overview Bond and van Reenen, 2007). We have tested for both ways of representing 
financial frictions. Neither of them had any effect on the dynamic optimisation, and no 
binding financial constraints were detected. 
Lastly, to shed more light on a potential explanation for the relatively strong evidence 
of pro-cyclicality, we identify a connection between pro-cyclicality and the degree of union 
density. Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) (see also Wunnava and Honney, 1991), use US data to 
derive a clear counter-cyclical relationship with the union premium. An explanation for this 
relationship is that unions use their bargaining power to set wages above opportunity wage 
but such that wages are more rigid over the business cycle than in less unionised sectors. This 
can be shown to follow from an optimising behaviour of unions (McDonald and Solow, 
1985). If union density is an indication of union power (Askildsen and Nilsen, 2002) this 
theory would predict a positive relationship between union density and degree of markup 
cyclicality. By investigating the correlation between the  reported in Table 2, and the union 
densities reported in Table 3, we find strongly significant (p-value = 0.000) correlations with 
size effects varying from 0.30 to 0.50, depending on whether we weight sectors according to 
number of firms, observations, average firm employment, or number of workers. This 
exercise does not provide any causal relationship between the estimated degree of cyclicity 
and union density, but results are in accordance with theoretical predictions and available 
evidence from other empirical studies on related issues. In the Scandinavian model, 
characterised with strong, nationwide unions, a possible explanation is related to unions being 
1μ
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concerned with macroeconomic consequences of wage setting. This is expected to result in 
flatter wage setting behaviour over the business cycle. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We have derived a relatively robust tendency for pro-cyclical markup fluctuations over the 
business cycle for a panel of Norwegian manufacturing firms. We only estimate counter-
cyclical markups in one sector. The results are in line with the firm-level studies by Chirinko 
and Fazzari (2000) and Fariñas and Huergo (2003). 
There is little evidence of markup cyclicality being associated with frictions in the 
labour market. The results may be interpreted as indications that there is some tendency for 
wages to be smoothed relatively more than prices over the business cycle. This may be due to 
the role played by unions, which in most sectors have a high proportion of workers as 
members. Some market power prevails in the final goods market. 
We have used a structural approach to estimate markups. The markups and their 
cyclicities are measured on a sample of medium-sized industry sector firms. The analyses are 
performed at industry sector level. An advantage of the chosen method is that we are then able 
to identify industry sector-specific properties that the theoretical model shows impact on 
markups and adjustment costs. 
In total, we find little evidence of the simultaneous occurrence of labour market 
inflexibilities and markup fluctuations. In further studies on markup cyclicity, more emphasis 
should be placed on price setting behaviour and price games. Such studies would require 
much narrower industry groups to define a relevant product market. 
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Appendix A. The estimated equation 
 
The estimated equation to be tested stems from using equations (7) and (8) and a Taylor 
expansion of 
1+t
t
μ
μ . Putting all this together, we get the following specification 
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subject to the non-linear (common factor restriction) 
1
32
4 π
πππ ⋅= , and assuming 1~ =ν . 
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Appendix B. Data23 
 
Firms in which the central or local governments own more than 50 per cent of the equity have 
been excluded from the sample, as well as observations that are reported as “copied from 
previous year”. This actually means missing data. We also excluded observations from 
auxiliary (non-production) plants as well as plants where part-time employees count for more 
than 25 per cent of the work force. Since the capital stock is used as the denominator in most 
of the variables used in the regression analysis, we make an attempt to isolate plants whose 
capital stock has a negligible role in production. Observations where the calculated 
replacement value of equipment and buildings together was less than NOK 200,000 (1980 
prices) are deleted.24 To avoid measurement errors of production, observations with non-
positive production levels are also deleted. The remaining data set was trimmed to remove 
outliers. Observations with ratios outside of five times the inter-quartile range above or below 
the sector specific median were excluded.25 
Finally, we included only series with at least six consecutive observations. Due to 
leading and lagging when constructing the explanatory variables, we loose two cross-sections. 
This leaves us with series of at least four consecutive observations. 
 
 25
 storage. 
                                                
Replacement value of capital stock (pIKt): The replacement value of capital is calculated 
separately for equipment and buildings using the perpetual inventory formula. Depreciation 
rates are taken from the Norwegian National Accounts (0.06 and 0.02 for equipment and 
buildings, respectively). The price indices for investment are also taken from the Norwegian 
National Accounts. When calculating the replacement value of capital, we use as a benchmark 
the oldest reported fire insurance value larger than or equal to NOK 200,000, measured in 
1980 prices. From these initial values, we calculate the replacement value backwards and 
forwards, using the investment figures.26 Finally we add together the two categories of 
capital. Real investment at time t in capital of type k equals purchases minus sales of fixed 
capital. Investments in equipment include machinery, office furniture, fittings and fixtures, 
and other transport equipment, excluding cars and trucks. The measure of buildings includes 
buildings used for production, offices and inventory
Output (ptYt): Gross production plus subsidies and minus taxes. 
Variable costs (wtLt + ctZt): Wage expenses and inputs. 
Employees (Lt): Number of employees. The change in the labour stock is defined as 
. 1−−= ititit LLX
Price indices (pt): Price indices for the industry sectors’ gross output collected from National 
Accounts. 
Sectoral Gross Domestic Product (GDPt): The industry sector values are collected from 
National Accounts. The GDPt values are annual. For sectors where the National Accounts 
give information at a less aggregated level than our sector specification, we have used the 
more detailed information. 
 
 
23 See also Halvorsen et al. (1991) for further details. 
24 Approximately £20,000. 
25 We used ratios for output and variable costs. 
26 If the replacement value of capital became negative, it was set equal to zero. When calculating the capital 
stock forward it may happen that the replacement value becomes negative because of large sales of capital 
goods. When calculating it backwards, the replacement value becomes negative if the net purchase of fixed 
capital is larger than the replacement value in year t+1. 
Table 1. Summary statistics
Food Textiles and Wood Paper Chemicals Minerals Metal
Clothing Products and Metals products
Sectors (ISIC) (311) (321-324) (331-332) (341) (351-356) (36, 37) (381-382)
Mean values of total sample
pY/pIK 2.297 1.384 1.496 0.950 1.393 1.185 1.588
(wL+cZ)/pIK 2.192 1.301 1.364 0.875 1.222 1.058 1.492
Lit 73 88 81 122 88 119 102
Δ Lit/Lit -0.021 -0.062 -0.019 -0.031 -0.040 -0.026 -0.026
Shares
                 Δ Lit/Lit <  -0.05 0.316 0.428 0.296 0.289 0.328 0.313 0.323
-0.05 <= Δ Lit/Lit  <= 0.05 0.456 0.426 0.443 0.517 0.464 0.457 0.432
  0.05 <   Δ Lit/Lit 0.229 0.146 0.261 0.193 0.208 0.230 0.245
                Δ Lit/Lit = 0 0.188 0.088 0.131 0.121 0.115 0.093 0.091
Nbr. of observations 1508 376 747 429 591 569 1071
Nbr. of firms 305 71 128 65 106 94 186
Mean values in 1985
pY/pIK 2.410 1.520 1.576 0.999 1.454 1.246 1.703
(wL+cZ)/pIK 2.301 1.422 1.443 0.929 1.297 1.091 1.587
Lit 75 83 79 111 91 121 103
Δ Lit/Lit -0.032 -0.003 0.014 -0.018 -0.018 0.001 -0.010
Shares
                 Δ Lit/Lit <  -0.05 0.313 0.256 0.294 0.333 0.159 0.203 0.233
-0.05 <= Δ Lit/Lit  <= 0.05 0.492 0.512 0.353 0.463 0.540 0.563 0.467
  0.05 <   Δ Lit/Lit 0.195 0.233 0.353 0.204 0.302 0.234 0.300
                Δ Lit/Lit = 0 0.203 0.140 0.094 0.074 0.143 0.203 0.125
Nbr. of observations/firms 128 43 85 54 63 64 120
Table 2. Euler Equation Estimates
Food Textiles and Wood Paper Chemicals Minerals Metal
Sector Clothing Products and Metals products
(ISIC) (311) (321-324) (331-332) (341) (351-356) (36, 37) (381-382)
Unrestriced estimates
π1 (μ0) 0.995 1.025 1.167 1.156 0.931 1.088 1.001
(0.058) (0.034) (0.055) (0.071) (0.151) (0.055) (0.069)
π2 (μ1) 0.034 -0.138 0.259 0.482 0.261 0.043 0.188
(0.065) (0.059) (0.190) (0.229) (0.113) (0.061) (0.106)
π3 (s) 8.341 5.206 -10.749 -24.074 41.035 5.729 7.064
(24.667) (4.552) (16.163) (13.375) (36.772) (20.248) (10.617)
π4 (s*μ1/μ0) 138.224 -84.153 -226.706 -259.040 371.237 368.159 113.034
(536.556) (63.282) (273.231) (183.077) (1119.614) (415.900) (194.394)
AR(1)-test -3.25 -3.31 -2.90 -2.80 -1.95 -3.94 -3.24
  p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00
AR(2)-test -1.82 0.69 -0.72 -0.88 -0.80 -1.01 -0.62
  p-value 0.07 0.49 0.47 0.38 0.43 0.31 0.54
Sargan 10.90 24.51 28.70 15.02 32.80 30.78 27.24
  p-value 0.82 0.55 0.33 0.52 0.17 0.24 0.40
Restriced estimates
μ0 0.996 1.032 1.151 1.069 0.963 1.065 1.014
(0.018) (0.011) (0.017) (0.022) (0.036) (0.017) (0.021)
μ1 0.041 -0.172 0.393 0.474 0.261 0.066 0.182
(0.018) (0.017) (0.047) (0.071) (0.036) (0.019) (0.034)
s 9.067 3.837 0.000 0.000 42.486 0.000 4.288
(7.749) (1.402) (5.111) (3.638) (11.531) (2.635) (2.993)
ComFac 0.66 17.44 11.24 101.07 1.04 24.15 3.33
  p-value 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.07
# obs. 1508 376 747 429 591 569 1072
# firms 305 71 128 65 106 94 186
Notes: One-step First-Difference Estimates of Euler Equation
See Appendix A for a presentation of the estimated model.
See main text for explanation of the instruments.
All standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity.
AR(1) is a test of first-order serial correlation, AR(2) a test of second order serial correlation.
Sargan is the Sargan/Hansen test of overidentification restrictions.
ComFac is a test of the validity of the common factor restriction imposed to get the
restricted estimates from the unrestricted ones.
Table 3. Union densities in percentage
Food Textiles and Wood Paper Chemicals Minerals Metal
Sectors Clothing Products and Metals products
(ISIC) (311) (321-324) (331-332) (341) (351-356) (36, 37) (381-382)
53 49 50 82 63 78 61
Notes: The numbers are measured in 1995 and based on census data as part of the project 
"Medvirkning, læring og belønning i det nye arbeidslivet" (eng. Participation, learning
and rewards in the new labour market")
Source: Institute for Labour and Social Research (FAFO).
